定向增发中风险投资的角色:制衡抑或串谋?

The role of venture capital in private placements:Balance or collusion?

完善定向增发定价机制是资本市场制度建设的重要内容,本研究立足于定向增发各参与主体的利益博弈关系,以我国创业板上市企业2012年—2017年间定向增发事件作为研究对象,分析风险投资和大股东在定向增发中的利益关系、利益输送行为及影响机制,结果表明:在面向大股东的定向增发中,风险投资与大股东之间存在利益冲突,风险投资发挥利益制衡作用,通过抑制企业负向盈余管理和市场择时来缓解大股东利益输送;在面向机构投资者的定向增发中,风险投资与大股东之间存在利益协同,风险投资发挥利益串谋作用,通过加剧企业正向盈余管理和市场择时来助推控股股东利益输送;此外,国有背景风投和联合背景风投在定向增发中的利益制衡作用与利益串谋作用更为显著.进一步研究发现,在2017年2月实施的定向增发新政实施前,风险投资与大股东在定向增发中的利益制衡和利益串谋作用更为显著;不同资本市场热度和企业组织形态下风险投资股东发挥的利益制衡和折价率影响都存在差异化结果.本研究从风险投资逐利效应新视角探讨风险投资与大股东之间动态变化的利益关系,检验政策、市场和企业不同情况下风险投资的影响效应,丰富了公司治理和中小股东利益保护理论,拓展定向增发定价影响因素研究边界.研究不仅为正确理性地看待风险投资发挥的价值增值作用提供了一定的经验证据,也对监管者改革定向增发定价机制、提升企业公司治理绩效提供了政策建议.

Improving the pricing mechanism of private placement is an important part of the capital market system construction.Based on the game relationship among the participants in private placements,this paper takes private placement events of Chinese GEM listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as the research object,and analyzes interest relationships,interest transfer behaviors,and influence mechanisms of venture capital and major shareholders in private placements.The results show that there is a conflict of interest between the venture capital and the major shareholders in the private placement for the major shareholders.VC can play the role of benefit balance and alleviate the interest transmission of the major shareholders by restraining the negative earnings management and market timing,which shows a lower discount rate.In the private placement for institutional investors,there is interest synergy between venture capital and major shareholders.Venture capital plays the role of benefit collusion by promoting the interest transfer of controlling shareholders by intensified positive earnings management and market timing,which also results in a lower discount rate.In addition,the state-owned background VC and the joint background VC play a more significant role in the private placements.Further research shows that before the implementation of the new policy of private placement implemented in February 2017,the role of venture capital and major shareholders in private placement was more significant.There are differences in the benefit balance and discount rate effects of venture capital and shareholders under different capital market heat and corporate organizational forms.This paper discusses the dynamically changing interest relationship between VC and major shareholders from a new perspective of the profitseeking effect of VC,and examines the impact of VC under different circumstances of policies,markets and companies,which enriches the theory of corporate governance and protection of minority shareholders'interests and expands the research boundary of private placement pricing influencing factors.This study not only provides some empirical evidence for a correct and rational view of the value-added role of venture capital,but also provides policy implications for regulators to deepen the reform of private placement pricing mechanism and improve corporate governance performance.