多效应下全球气候联盟稳定性的博弈分析

Game analysis of stable global climate coalition under multiple effects

如何建立一个广泛参与、稳定的、减排效果显著的全球气候联盟一直是国际社会急需解决的问题.本研究将气候联盟模型分解为外部效应、时间效应和成本效应,分别在对称和非对称条件下,对比研究了不合作、完全合作、库诺特联盟两阶段静态博弈和斯坦克尔伯格联盟三阶段动态博弈的减排结果,并通过模拟确定了稳定的联盟规模.研究发现:联盟的外部效应的正向作用和时间效应的负向作用在一定情况下会相互抵消或占优.当成本收益比接近0时,联盟的净收益会较小,此时时间效应占优,领导者会减少自身减排量,诱导追随者增加减排量,如此会吸引更多的参与者,最终形成稳定的大联盟,从而解释了“合作悖论”.成本效应源于不对称国家的出现,使外部效应不再是严格的正向作用,并产生了交易转让的需求.对于高收益且低成本的国家,时间效应的影响最大;对于高收益且高成本的国家,成本效应的影响最大.通过模拟发现,当成本和收益呈现负协方差的偏态分布时,非对称性越明显越有利于联盟的稳定和减排效果.

How to establish a global climate coalition with broad participation,stability,and significant abatement effect has been an urgent issue for the international community.This paper divides the climate coalition models into the externality effect,timing effect,and cost effect ones.The equilibrium results of non-cooperation,full cooperation,a two stages static game of Cournot coalition,and a three stages dynamic game of Stackelberg coalition are compared under symmetric and asymmetric conditions.The stable coalition sizes are determined by simulation.It is found that the positive effect of externality effect and the negative effect of timing effect would offset or dominate each other under certain conditions within the coalition.When the cost-benefit ratio is close to O,the net benefit of the coalition is small,with the timing effect becoming dominant.Leaders will reduce abatement and induce followers to increase abatement.This will attract more participants and form a stable grand coalition eventually,which explains the"cooperation paradox".The cost effect stems from asymmetry among countries,which makes the externality effect no longer strictly positive and creating the need for payment transfers.For countries with high benefits and low costs,the timing effect is the greatest.For countries with high benefits and high costs,the cost effect is the greatest.The simulation results show that when costs and benefits present a skewness distribution with negative covariance,the more pronounced the asymmetry,the more stable and effective the abatement effects of coalitions.