供应链视角下成长型企业债转股比例的模型分析

Model Analysis of Debt-to-Equity Ratio for Growth Firm from the Perspective of Supply Chain

债转股是新经济形势下降低企业杠杆率的重要举措,但目前市场化债转股陷入“签约多、落地少”的困境,极大地降低了债转股的实施成效.文章基于供应链运营视角构建了陷入债务危机的成长型供应商的债转股模型,探讨了实施机构的最优转股比例和供应商的最优运营决策,分析了双方的债转股实施条件和多方博弈行为产生的影响.研究发现:实施机构在高市盈率时选择将全部股权转换为债权,在低市盈率时将最优转股比例制定为供应商愿意实施债转股的最低水平;高成长性和高市盈率的合理匹配有助于债转股的顺利实施,实现双方共赢,高成长性和低市盈率的错配仅能化解债务危机,供应商盈利能力无法提升,而低成长性供应商不应成为债转股标的企业.此外,零售商参与的多方博弈有损供应商和实施机构的利益,甚至在供应商成长性较低时易陷入“囚徒困境”,增加了债转股实施的难度.

The debt-to-equity swap is an important way to reduce the leverage ratio of enterprises in the new economic situation.However,the market-oriented debt-to-equity swap falls into the dilemma of“more signing and less landing”,which greatly reduces its implementation effect.Present study constructs a debt-to-equity model for growth supplier in debt crisis under the perspective of supply chain,investigates the optimal swap ratio of AMC and operational decision of supplier,and analyses the swap conditions as well as the effect of multi-player game.The results are as follows:Firstly,the AMC chooses to convert all the debt to equity under high P/E ratio,but sets the swap ratio at the minimum value that the supplier is willing to adopt the debt-to-equity swap under low P/E ratio.Secondly,the reasonable matching of high growth and high P/E ratio is conducive to the implementation of the swap and the achievement of win-win situation,while the mismatch of high growth and low P/E ratio can only resolve the debt crisis but cannot improve supplier profitability.However,the low growth supplier should not be the target enterprise of debt-to-equity swap.Finally,the multi-player game behavior is detrimental to the benefits of the supplier and AMC,and even causes to the“prisoner's dilemma”for low-growth supplier,which increased the difficulty in implementing debt-to-equity swap.