科技创新再贷款能否转为长期货币政策工具——基于演化博弈分析

Can Sci-tech Innovation Re-lending be Converted to a Long-term Monetary Policy Tool:An Analysis Based on Evolutionary Game

科技创新再贷款有助于引导金融机构加大对科创企业的金融支持力度,撬动社会资金促进科技创新。文章通过构建“银行金融机构—非银行金融机构—企业”的三方演化博弈模型,探讨科技创新再贷款作为长期货币政策工具的必要性与效应。研究发现,三方演化博弈最终确实趋向金融机构不进入科技金融市场、企业选择不创新的稳定状态,这种状态“损耗”科技企业创新活力;作为外部因素,科技创新再贷款具有改变科技金融市场的三方博弈稳定性、激发科技企业创新积极性的效能,因而十分有必要作为长期货币政策工具来使用;科技创新再贷款政策具有激励效应、约束效应、间接效应和利率效应,能推动银行金融机构和非银行金融机构创新科技金融业务与服务,进而满足科技企业的融资需求并鼓励企业创新。基于研究结论,提出扩大支持范围、分类确额、加强监管和强化政策联动的建议。

Sci-tech innovation re-lending helps guide financial institutions to increase financial support for sci-tech enterprises and leverage social funds to promote technological innovation.This paper explores the necessity and effectiveness of using sci-tech innovation re-lending as a long-term monetary policy tool by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving"bank financial institutions—non-bank financial institutions—enterprises".The study finds that the evolutionary game among the three parties tends to stabilize in a state where financial institutions do not enter the tech-financial market,and enterprises opt not to innovate,thereby"depleting"the innovative vitality of sci-tech enterprises.As an external factor,sci-tech innovation re-lending can alter the stability of the tripartite game in the tech-financial market and stimulate the innovation enthusiasm of sci-tech enterprises.Therefore,it is highly necessary to use it as a long-term monetary policy tool.The sci-tech innovation re-lending policy has incentive effects,constraint effects,indirect effects,and interest rate effects,which can drive both bank and non-bank financial institutions to innovate in tech-financial services,thereby meeting the financing needs of sci-tech enterprises and encouraging their innovation.Based on the study′s conclusions,the paper suggests expanding the scope of support,issuing quotas based on the lending categories,strengthening supervision,and enhancing policy coordination.