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公立医院医生双任务激励契约研究

Analysis on Dual-Task Incentives Contract for the Physicians in Public Hospitals
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摘要 目的:探究政府激励公立医院医生完成经济性和公益性两项任务契约设计的影响因素,并提出相应的激励策略。方法:采用多任务委托代理模型进行研究。结果:政府的最优激励系数与医生努力的成本系数、医生的风险规避度及任务成本呈负相关,不确定的外部环境对其影响不同。结论:公立医院医生激励契约的实现需要政府根据参数变化及时调整相应激励策略,以保障我国医疗服务的公益性和长期利润的获取。 Objective:To explore the influencing factors of the incentives contract of the government for physicians in public hospitals to complete economic and public welfare tasks,and provide corresponding incentive strategies.Methods:Modeling method of multi task principal-agent theory are applied.Results:The optimal incentive coefficient of the government are negatively associated with the cost coefficient of physicians'efforts,physicians'risk attitudes and cost relevance.The uncertainty of the external environment has different effects.Conclusion:The realization of the incentive contract for physicians in public hospitals requires the government to timely adjust the corresponding incentive strategies according to the changes of parameters,so as to ensure the public welfare of medical services and the acquisition of long-term profits.
作者 王俏荔 杨立宏 於君 Wang Qiaoli;Yang Lihong;Yu Jun(School of Humanities and Management,Ningxia Medical University,Yinchuan,Ningxia,750004,China;不详)
出处 《中国卫生经济》 北大核心 2024年第10期73-75,80,共4页 Chinese Health Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71964028) 宁夏医科大学校级重点科研项目(XZ2022012)。
关键词 医生双任务 多任务委托代理 激励契约 公立医院 physician dual-task multitask principal-agent incentive contract public hospital
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