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信息经济学视域下中国职业年金治理结构优化研究

The Optimization of Governance Structure of Occupational Annuity in China from the Perspective of Information Economics
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摘要 为了应对公共养老金的支出飙升,老龄化社会下的政府面临巨大的挑战,各国陆续推出职业年金制度,引入雇主、雇员等主体分担养老金风险。我国相继推出企业年金、职业年金两项制度,以责任共担机制应对老龄化风险。囿于监管政策迟滞、流程办法缺失、内在动力不足等原因,职业年金治理结构亟待优化。以信息经济学视角切入,文章从委托代理理论视角分析职业年金治理结构存在的信息效率、参与约束、激励相容等方面的问题,结果表明通过提高信息效率、科学设置激励措施、加强监督体系等对策有利于职业年金治理结构的优化。通过优化职业年金方案设计,增强对参与者的吸引力;从机制设计方面推动代理人实施完美的代理行为,才能确保职业年金的治理符合委托人利益最大化的目标要求。职业年金治理结构的优化可以提升制度的吸引力和效率,为退休人员提供更好的养老保障。 In order to cope with the soaring expenditure of public pension funds and the enormous challenges faced by governments in an aging society,countries have successively introduced occupational annuity systems,introducing employers,employees and other entities to share pension risks.China has successively introduced two systems:enterprise annuity and occupational annuity to address the risk of aging through a shared responsibility mechanism.Due to regulatory policy delays,lack of process and methods,and insufficient internal motivation,the governance structure of occupational annuity urgently needs to be optimized.From the perspective of information economics,this paper analyzes the problems of information efficiency,participation constraints,and incentive compatibility in the governance structure of occupational annuity from the perspective of agency theory.The results show that improving information efficiency,scientifically setting incentive measures,and strengthening the supervision system are conducive to optimizing the governance structure of occupational annuity.By optimizing the design of occupational annuity schemes,policy designs aim to enhance their attractiveness to participants.Only by promoting perfect agency behavior through mechanism design can programs ensure that the governance of occupational annuity meets the goal of maximizing the interests of the principal.The optimization of the governance structure of occupational annuity can enhance the attractiveness and efficiency of the system,and provide better pension security for retirees.
作者 陈姗 CHEN Shan(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350000,China)
出处 《四川轻化工大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 2024年第5期60-69,共10页 Journal of Sichuan University of Science & Engineering:Social Sciences Edition
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(19YJC840003)。
关键词 职业年金 委托代理 治理结构 逆向选择 道德风险 参与约束 激励相容 occupational annuity agency by agreement governance structure adverse selection moral hazard participation constraint incentive compatibility
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