队列中的信息异构:基于口碑传播的等待制服务系统定价决策

Information Heterogeneity in a Queue:Pricing Decision in Waiting Service Systems with Word-of-mouth

随着现代服务业的快速发展,顾客获取服务信息的渠道变得愈发多样,因此,他们对服务信息的掌握程度是不同的,即顾客获取服务信息具有异质性。本文考虑了一种包含会员顾客和非会员顾客的等待制服务系统,两类顾客获取的服务信息是异质的,其中会员顾客能够获得充分的服务信息并做出理性决策,而非会员顾客没有相关的服务信息,为避免盲目决策,他们主动搜寻口碑传播,通过接收口碑信息来估测服务效用进而做出选择。首先,本文充分描述了会员顾客的均衡策略行为,并研究非会员顾客获取服务评级反馈信息数量对会员顾客排队行为的影响。然后建构服务提供商的收益函数,得出服务提供商最优服务定价。研究发现,较小的会员顾客市场规模可能会导致服务提供商较高的最优定价。此外,当会员顾客的市场规模超过某一特定值,并且服务会员顾客的服务速率大于非会员顾客时,那么,随着非会员顾客获得的服务价值评级反馈信息数量的增大,综合评级高(低)的提供商应该降低(提升)服务定价,反之亦然。

In today's information service society,there are various channels for customers to obtain service information.On one hand,some customers can easily grasp service information and make rational decisions according to relevant service information.On the other hand,due to the influence of various factors,it is difficult for some customers to obtain service information.In order to avoid blind decision,they can use the word of mouth(WOM)information to confirm whether they can trust such service,that is,WOM information can provide more reliable guarantee for their decision making.On the basis of this phenomenon,in this paper,it aims to deal with the related following questions:Q1.When the queue information obtained is heterogeneous,how do the two types of delay-sensitive customers make their own queuing decisions,how do the decisions of non-member customers affect the member customers’equilibrium queuing strategies?Q2.As the market size of member customers changes,how should the service provider make the optimal pricing decision to maximize his revenue without changing service capacity?Q3.As non-member customers collect more WOM information,how should the service provider adjust the optimal service price?To address these research questions,this paper considers a non-preemptive M/M/1 priority queuing model,which includes two types of customers,namely,member and non-member customers.The service information obtained by the two types of customers is heterogeneous,where member customers can obtain sufficient service-related information and make rational decisions,while non-member customers have no relevant service information and can only rely on WOM ways to make decisions,such as interpersonal channels or service rating websites,that is,they can obtain relevant experience information from relatives and friends who have purchased service,or use review websites to collect relevant rating information on the service value to know the service.The equilibrium strategic behavior of member customers is described and the influence of the number of ratings on the service value obtained by nonmember customers on the queuing behavior of member customers is studied.Then the revenue function of service provider is constructed and the optimal service strategy of service provider is obtained.The main results show that,first,the decision-making behavior of non-member customers affects the queuing strategy of member customers as well as the optimal service pricing decision of the service provider.Therefore,it is very important to grasp the decision-making behavior of non-member customers to maximize the revenue of the service provider.Second,the smaller market size of member customers may improve the optimal pricing of service provider.In addition,when the market size of member customers is large,the number of WOM information and the market size of member customers have a weak impact on the optimal service pricing.Third,when the market size of member customers exceeds a certain value,and the service rate of member customers is greater than that of non-member customers,then the high overall rating(low overall rating)provider should decrease(increase)the service price as the number of rating on the service value received by non-member customers increases,and vice versa.