双边道德风险下委托代理产学研合作创新的博弈模型研究

Research on the game model of principal-agent industry-university-research cooperation innovation under the bilateral moral hazard

深化校企产学研合作创新是推动科技成果转化赋能企业提质增效的重要动力,然而近年虚假、无实质性内容的产学研合作层出不穷,为此从双边道德风险视角探讨了地方政府、高校或科研机构、科技企业与科研人员之间产学研创新合作的委托代理关系,构建了相关科技企业与科研人员的进化博弈模型,从策略的进化稳定性方面进行了分析.结果表明:地方政府、高校或科研机构应加强委托代理产学研虚假合作的督查与惩罚力度,并适当减少高校或科研机构对科研人员的工作量奖励;提高科技企业与科研人员积极协同的总收益有益于推进双方的委托代理产学研合作创新.

Deepening the industry-university-research cooperation innovation between universities and enterprises is an important driving force to promote the transformation of scientific and technological achievements from universities to enterprises,and to enable enterprises to improve their quality and efficiency.However,in recent years,fake and non-substantive industry-university-research cooperation has emerged one after another.Therefore,from the perspective of bilateral moral hazard,this paper discusses the principal-agent relationship of industry-university-research cooperation among local governments,universities or scientific research institutions,scientific and technological enterprises and scientific researchers.The evolutionary game model between scientific and technological enterprises and researchers is constructed,and the evolutionary stability of strategy is analyzed.The results show that local governments,universities or research institutions should strengthen the inspection and punishment of fake cooperation,and appropriately reduce the workload reward to researchers in universities or research institutions.It is also found that increasing the total revenue of active collaboration between the scientific and technological enterprises and the researchers is beneficial to promoting the active principal-agent industry-university-research cooperation innovation.