考虑物流枢纽溢出效应的地方政府补贴策略分析

The Analysis of Local Government Subsidy Strategy Considering Logistics Hub Spillover Effect

物流枢纽能够产生经济溢出效应,但在竞争环境中,其策略性行为可能会流失部分货源,导致各方利益受损并影响溢出效应发挥作用。地方政府可对到当地物流枢纽中转货物的托运人补贴,帮助当地物流枢纽吸引货源并发展地区经济。本文构建以地方政府为主导者,物流枢纽为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别考虑无政府补贴、一方政府补贴和双方政府补贴三种情形,探讨溢出效应对地方政府最优补贴策略的作用机理。研究表明,两物流枢纽经济溢出系数均较小时,双方政府的均衡策略为均不补贴;经济溢出系数均适中或差异较大时,均衡策略为一方政府补贴;经济溢出系数均较大时,均衡策略为均补贴。数值分析验证了相关结论,分析了经济溢出系数、运输成本等关键参数的影响。

Logistics hubs can generate the economic spillover effect.But in the competitive environment,the strategic behavior of logistics hubs may cause them to lose some source of cargo,resulting in profit loss of all parties and affecting the exertion of spillover effect.The local government can provide subsidies to shippers who transfer cargo to the local logistics hub,which could help the hub attract cargo and develop the regional economy.The Stackelberg game model with local government as the leader and logistics hub as the follower was constructed.The mechanism of spillover effect on the optimal subsidy strategy of local government was discussed by considering three cases:without government subsidies,one government provides subsidies,and both governments provide subsidies.The results show that when the economic spillover coefficients of logistics hubs are both small,the equilibrium strategy of the two local governments is no subsidy.When the economic spillover coefficients of the logistics hubs are both medium or have great differences,the equilibrium strategy is only one local government provides subsidies.When the economic spillover coefficients are both large,the equilibrium strategy is both local governments provide subsidies.Numerical analysis verifies the relevant conclusions and analyzes the impacts of key parameters such as economic spillover coefficient and transportation cost.