产能分享平台增值服务提供方资质监管策略研究

Qualification Supervision Strategies for Value-added Service Providers on the Capacity-sharing Platform

根据产能分享平台对增值服务提供方的资质监管实践,在罚金策略、清退策略、推广策略、组合策略(罚金+推广)下构建基于双边市场理论的博弈模型,分析平台最优监管策略。研究发现:相较于不监管,四种资质监管策略均能改善服务供应侧平均资质水平,改善程度取决于双边用户的交叉网络外部性、高资质服务提供方的市场占比、高资质服务提供方的资质水平、服务需求方对资质的敏感度等因素的相互作用;只有采用清退策略可能使平台利润减小;当高资质服务提供方对平台推广不够敏感时,采用组合策略是最优策略;当高资质服务提供方市场占比足够大时,采用推广策略相较于采用罚金策略能使平台获得更多利润。研究为制造业产能分享平台在增值服务能力交易市场的监管机制提供理论依据和管理启示。

According to the practice of capacity-sharing platforms,the optimal qualification supervision strategies for value-added service providers were studied.Models were constructed under penalty,exclusion,advertising,and combination(penalty+advertising)strategies based on the twosided market theory.The research finds that,compared with no supervision,the four qualification supervision strategies can improve the average qualification level of the service supply side.The degree of improvement depends on the interaction of critical factors such as the cross-network externality of bilateral users,the market share of highly qualified service providers,the qualification level of highly qualified service providers,and the sensitivity of service demanders to the qualification.Among the four strategies,only the exclusion strategy may reduce the platform's profit.When highly qualified service providers are not sensitive enough to the platform's advertising,the combination strategy is the optimal strategy.When the market share of highly qualified service providers is large enough,the advertising strategy can make the platform more profitable than the penalty strategy.The theoretical references and management inspirations for the supervision mechanism in the value-added service capacity trading market on the manufacturing capacity-sharing platform are provided.