短期信贷与银企双向寻租:存在证据与形成机制

Short-term Credit and Bidirectional Rent-seeking between Banks and Firms:Evidence and Formation Mechanism

本文基于我国非金融企业债务短期化的融资异象,深入剖析信贷参与双方的利益诉求和关系特征,从银企双向寻租的视角探讨企业短期信贷蕴含的租金成本。针对我国2008—2023年沪深A股上市公司的实证研究发现,短期信贷配置产生了超额手续费和招待差旅费,从供需两端形成了包括银行租和企业租在内的双重租金成本。本文利用产业政策和资管新规的外生政策冲击检验,以及与房价相关联的企业抵押品价值的工具变量分析,验证了结论的可靠性。渠道机制分析表明,在银行租方面,短期信贷强化了商业银行融资主导地位以及信息独占优势,进而催生了垄断租金和信息租金;在企业租方面,短期信贷加剧了企业流动性风险而强化企业信贷寻租动机,最终形成了银企双向寻租行为。异质性分析发现,宏观层面的宽松货币政策和金融市场化以及微观企业的资产专用性和民营属性有助于抑制短期信贷寻租。后果检验发现,短期信贷寻租降低了企业资本投资效率和研发投资水平,产生了“绊脚石”效应。最后,短期信贷中银企寻租行为存在互动关系。本文的研究为优化企业融资结构、改善银企关系以及深化金融供给侧结构性改革提供了借鉴。

Enhancing the quality and efficiency of financial services for the real economy is crucial for promoting highquality economic development.In China,commercial bank credit serves as the primary channel for corporate financing;however,banks opt to replace long-term loans with rolling short-term credit due to safety concerns.This preference has led to a significant accumulation of short-term interest-bearing liabilities among firms during their rapid expansion.However,the excessive allocation of short-term credit has exacerbated corporate maturity mismatches,significantly increased refinancing risks,and compressed the net interest margin of banks,leading to a divergence between banks’pursuit of profitability and maintenance of stability.In this context,it is essential to assess the interest conflicts and strategic behaviors of both banks and firms from an economically rational perspective.Such an analysis can provide theoretical foundations for advancing supply-side structural reform while establishing mechanisms that support real economic development.This study focuses on how banks and firms respond to interest conflicts in short-term credit through rent-seeking,specifically aiming to answer the following questions.From the perspective of banks,the repeated negotiation and frequent contracting characteristics of short-term credit grant banks greater flexibility in dynamically adjusting financial covenants.It raises a question about whether banks engage in rent-seeking in short-term credit,thereby forming“bank rents”.Concurrently,from the perspective of firms,short-term credit increases liquidity risk.Thus,do firms increase rent-seeking behaviors to strengthen their relationship with banks,thus forming“firm rents”?Furthermore,how do supply-side and demand-side characteristics affect bidirectional rent-seeking between banks and firms in short-term credit?Do these shortterm credit rent-seeking behaviors lead to efficiency losses?Taking non-financial listed companies in the Chinese A-share market from 2008 to 2023 as research samples,this study employs handling fees in financial expenses as a proxy indicator of bank rent,and hospitality and travel expenses in general and administrative expenses as a proxy indicator of firm rent.By examining the sensitivity coefficient between dual rents and the proportion of short-term credit allocation,we identify whether there is bidirectional rent-seeking between banks and firms in short-term credit.The empirical results are as follows.(1)Short-term credit generates excess handling fees and hospitality and travel expenses,culminating in dual rents encompassing both bank rents and firm rents.Robustness checks including exogenous policy shock tests(e.g.industrial policy and new asset management regulations)and instrumental variable analysis(e.g.the value of corporate collateral linked to house prices)verify the reliability of our conclusions.(2)On the supply side,short-term credit reinforces the dominant position and information advantages of commercial banks,thereby fostering monopoly rents alongside informational rents.On the demand side,short-term credit exacerbates firms’liquidity risks and aggravates rent-seeking.(3)Macro-level loose monetary policies and financial marketization,as well as micro-level asset specificity and private ownership of firms could mitigate rent-seeking behaviors.(4)Bidirectional rent-seeking between banks and firms in short-term credit reduces corporate capital investment efficiency and R&D investment levels,generating a“stumbling block”effect.Our findings offer valuable insights into optimizing corporate financing structures,improving bank-firm relations and deepening supply-side structural reform.The contributions of this paper include three aspects.First,this paper explains how banks and firms adjust their interests through rent-seeking in short-term credit relationships,thereby expanding the impact of short-term credit on nonproductive activities.Second,this paper distinguishes the characteristics of credit term structure and reveals the existence and formation mechanism of bidirectional rent-seeking between banks and firms,thus enriching the rent-seeking theory in credit resource allocation.Third,there is a debate on whether credit rent-seeking plays the role of“lubricant”or“stumbling block”;this paper supports the latter concerning rent-seeking in short-term credit.This also highlights the urgency and importance of optimizing credit resource allocation through supply-side structural reform.