宽恕的道德理由——基于第二人称立场的分析

The Moral Justification for Forgiveness:A Second-person Standpoint

宽恕通常被定义为放下怨恨,作为一种仁慈的美德备受推崇。然而,当怨恨合理表达出对道德伤害的不满或蕴含了寻求平等、承认与尊重的正当诉求时,这种怨恨是否应被完全放下?宽恕是否应被无条件推崇?一些道德哲学家主张无须以忏悔和改正为前提的无条件宽恕。这种观点忽视了受害者的情感需求及其对公正处理的期待,同时也会淡化行为责任,削弱社会正义感,进而超越传统道德中的责任与义务范畴。另外一些道德哲学家虽然主张有条件的宽恕,即基于道德理由放下怨恨。但是他们提出的道德理由大多基于对结果的考量,从而是基于可欲求性而不是可信性的错误类型的理由。从第二人称的立场看,宽恕应建立在相互尊重的基础上,需冒犯者采取实际行动来弥补伤害,受害者自愿放下怨恨,这样的宽恕才是一种真正的和解。

Forgiveness is commonly defined as the act of relinquishing resentment and is esteemed as a virtue of benevolence.However,when resentment validly expresses dissatisfaction with moral injuries or encapsulates legitimate claims for equal recognition and respect,should this resentment be wholly abandoned,and should forgiveness be unconditionally advocated?Some moral philosophers support unconditional forgiveness without the need for repentance or rectification.This position might neglect the emotional needs of victims and their expectations for just treatment,potentially diminishing accountability and undermining social justice,thus exceeding the bounds of responsibility and duty within traditional morality.Other philosophers propose conditional forgiveness,suggesting that resentment be relinquished based on moral grounds.Yet,these grounds often focus on consequentialist considerations,thereby presenting reasons based on desirability rather than on the credibility of moral actions.From a second-person standpoint,forgiveness should be founded on mutual respect,necessitating that the offender takes concrete steps to redress the harm caused,and that the victim voluntarily releases their resentment.Only then does forgiveness achieve genuine reconciliation.