社会失信与企业“短贷长投”:兼论失信信息公开制度的治理效应

Social Dishonesty and Corporate“Short-term Financing for Long-term Investment”:On the Governance Effect of the System of Disclosing Dishonest Information

社会失信环境是影响企业投融资结构的重要因素。本文基于最高人民法院公布的失信被执行人数据,考察了社会失信对企业“短贷长投”的实际效应和影响机制。研究发现:(1)社会失信对企业投融资期限结构产生了显著影响,地区失信程度越严重,企业越依赖于使用短期贷款进行长期投资,“短贷长投”水平越高。(2)机制检验表明,社会失信通过信息不对称机制增加了企业外部融资约束,同时也增加了企业内部委托代理成本,导致企业“投资—短期贷款”敏感性提高,加剧了企业“短贷长投”。(3)在数字金融发展水平较低、银行业竞争较弱的地区和管理层激励程度较低的企业中,社会失信对企业“短贷长投”的推升作用表现得更加明显。(4)以“司法主导”为特征的失信信息公开制度的实施能够发挥显著的治理效应,可以降低企业融资约束和内部代理成本,进而有效缓解社会失信环境下企业的“短贷长投”倾向。本文研究为理解企业投融资期限配置决策提供了新的视角,对防范与化解金融风险具有重要政策启示。

Chinese corporations exhibit a significant phenomenon of“short-term financing for long-term investment”,where the maturity mismatch of investment and financing results in severe debt risks for these enterprises.As an important consideration for banks and financial institutions to issue loans,credit will also change the lending behavior of banks and corporations,thus affecting the allocation of corporate investment and financing terms.In recent years,the surge in the number of dishonest defaulters in China has become a social focal point.Understanding the impact of the social dishonest environment on the corporate“short-term financing for long-term investment”is an important and urgent issue to explore.Furthermore,China's social credit system is undergoing a profound transformation,with traditional areas that were previously governed by informal norms gradually being brought under the jurisdiction of formal institutions.Based on this background of institutional evolution,this paper further examines the external governance effect of the dishonest information disclosure system on corporate“short-term financing for long-term investment”.This study conducted an empirical analysis by matching the data on dishonest defaulters published by the Supreme People's Court with data from listed companies from 2007 to 2017,The research finds that:(1)Social dishonesty significantly exacerbates the phenomenon of corporate“short-term financing for long-term investment”.(2)The impact of social dishonesty is more pronounced in regions with low levels of digital financial development,weaker banking competition,and in corporations with lower management incentives.(3)Mechanism tests indicate that social dishonesty increases external financing constraints and internal agency costs for enterprises,thus aggravating the corporate“short-term financing for long-term investment”.(4)The implementation of the dishonest information disclosure system can reduce corporate financing constraints and internal agency costs,effectively alleviating the tendency of corporations to engage in“short-term financing for long-term investment”in a socially dishonest environment.Compared to existing literature,the marginal contributions of this paper are as follows:(1)This paper makes up for the limitations of how a single informal system or formal system affects corporate“short-term financing for long-term investment”,comprehensively examines the micro economic effects of social dishonesty and the disclosure system of dishonesty information,and enriches relevant research perspectives.(2)Combined with the dual path of supply side and demand side,this paper explains how social dishonesty affects the investment and financing term allocation of firms through the mechanism of“external financing constraints”and“internal agency costs”,which supplements the traditional firm maturity matching theory.(3)This paper provides a basis for correctly understanding the effectiveness of external dishonesty governance mode under the background of social credit system construction.