摘要
近年来我国信用评级行业竞争愈发激烈,而评级机构是如何采取不同评级策略维护或扩大其市场份额的呢?本文以2016~2020年我国信用债为样本,探究了评级结果策略、评级收费策略和主动评级策略对信用评级机构市场份额的影响,研究发现,偏高的评级结果策略、偏低的评级收费策略能帮助评级机构占据更大的市场份额,而主动评级策略对信用评级机构提升市场份额并无帮助,甚至会导致市场份额下降。同时,评级策略之间还会相互影响,对其市场份额产生不同作用。而声誉机制能够发挥积极的作用,让偏高评级、偏低收费的信用评级策略带来的市场份额扩张程度有所削弱,并提高主动评级的公益性,导致其带来的市场份额缩小效果进一步降低。本文为针对评级机构的有效监管提供了借鉴和参考,也为信用评级的市场化改革和声誉机制的有效建立提供了经验证据。
Given that the credit rating industry in China has becoming more and more competitive,how does the credit rating agencies(CRAs hereafter)adopt different strategies to maintain or increase their market share?Based on credit bonds issued in China from 2016 to 2020,this study examines the effects of rating result strategy,rating fee strategy and unsolicited rating strategy on the market share of CRAs,finding that:high rating result strategy and low rating fee strategy can help CRAs to obtain larger market share.The unsolicited rating strategy does not help CRAs to increase their market shares,and even lead to a decline.In addition,the rating strategies interact with each other and affect the market share of CARs.At the same time,rating strategies would influence each other and have different effects on their market share.The reputation mechanism can play a positive role in weakening the market share expansion brought by the credit rating strategies of high rating and low fee,and improving the public welfare of active rating,resulting in further attenuating the market share reduction effect brought by it.This study provides empirical evidence on the regulation of CRAs and the market reform of credit rating market to establish the reputation mechanism.
作者
连立帅
李异同
沈佳瑛
朱松
Lian Lishuai;Li Yitong;Shen Jiaying;Zhu Song
出处
《金融学季刊》
2024年第1期121-145,共25页
Quarterly Journal of Finance
基金
国家社会科学基金项目一般项目(22BGL086)
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(18YJA630156)
上海市“科技创新行动计划”软科学研究项目(23692107500)
中国博士后科学基金(2020M671065)的资助。
关键词
信用评级
评级策略
声誉机制
市场竞争
credit rating
rating strategy
reputation mechanism
market competition