日本陆军对华盛顿会议认知的转变及其影响

The Perception Change of the Japanese Army regarding the Washington Conference and Its Impact

1921年华盛顿会议召开前夕,日本陆军以相对积极的态度参与会议准备工作,制定了参会目标及相关议题的应对策略,且未在会后对会议结果表现出明显的不满。1923年后,陆军突然改变了上述态度,开始秤击华盛顿会议及《九国公约》。陆军转变态度的主要原因不在于会议达成了其难以接受的决议,也不在于会议迫使日本解散日英同盟、撤退部分在华日军,而在于陆军对美国认知的变化、对外务省“协调主义”外交的不满,他们强调华盛顿会议损害了日本在华利益。为此,日本陆军在1924年年初制定了“对华政策纲领”,要求外务省改变对华外交,集中体现了其干涉中国内政、搜取中国资源的政策要求和“对美必有一战”的战略认知。日本外务省没有完全同意陆军的主张,陆军遂在1924年后开启了独自的对华行动。

On the eve of the Washington Conference in 1921,the Japanese Army participated in the preparation for the conference with a relatively positive attitude and formulated the goals of attending the conference and the strategies for dealing with related issues.Furthermore,it did not show obvious dissatisfaction with the results after the conference.However,the Army suddenly changed the above attitude after 1923 and began to criticise the Washington Conference and the Nine-Power Treaty.The main reason for its attitude change was not that the conference reached a resolution that was difficult for the Army to accept,nor that the conference forced Japan to dissolve the Japanese-British Alliance and withdraw some Japanese troops in China.It was because that the Army's cognition and feelings towards the United States deteriorated and it was dissatisfied with the'coordinating diplomacy'conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.It emphasised that the Washington Conference damaged Japan's interests in China.Accordingly,the Army formulated the‘China Policy Guidelines'in early 1924,requiring the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to change its diplomacy towards China,which concentrated on the Army's policy requirements of interfering in China's internal affairs and seizing China's resources and reflected its strategic cognition of‘there must be a war with the United States'.The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not fully agree with the Army's proposition,therefore,the Army initiated its own actions against China after 1924.