迈向“中国质造”:信任品质量追赶与质量标准渐进式提升

China's Quality Manufacturing Transition:Quality Catch-Up of Credence Goods and Gradual Improvement of Quality Standards

自改革开放以来,中国快速发展成为制造业大国,但以食品为代表的信任品市场,却反复陷入质量危机和信任危机。本文通过构建包含监管者、国内企业和来自发达国家的质量领先企业的博奔模型,研究发现,在国内行业发展初期,如果政府选择一个过高且远超国内企业制造能力的质量标准,会逆向激励一些国内企业进行虚假创新,并进一步造成政府监管负荷过重进而引发监管失效。本文研究表明,过高的质量标准会增加产品质量的不确定性,提高风险事件的发生概率。政府应当根据国内企业的制造能力及其动态变化,循序渐进地提高质量标准,这是持续提升信任品质量、保障信任品行业稳步发展的有效路径。

The accelerated development of reform and opening-up has transformed China into a major manufacturing power.However,the credence goods market,particularly the food sector,has repeatedly faced crises related to quality and consumer trust.This paper establishes and analyzes a game model involving regulators,domestic firms,and quality-leading enterprises from developed countries.The findings indicate that,in the early stages of domestic industry development,setting excessively high minimum quality standards-exceeding the average quality and manufacturing capacity of local firms-一can create adverse incentives.Specifically,some firms may resort to deceptive practices to superficially meet these standards,while regulators may face excessive enforcement challenges,ultimately undermining the effectiveness of regulatory frameworks.The implementation of overly stringent standards increases uncertainty about product quality and heightens the risk of incidents,thereby hindering industry development.The study recommends a gradual increase in quality standards,aligned with the evolving capabilities of domestic firms.Although this approach may require more time,it provides a feasible and effective pathway to continuously enhance the quality of credence goods and support industry growth.This measured strategy ensures sustainable quality improvement while avoiding the pitfalls associated with overly ambitious standards.