摘要
在德性伦理学的当代复兴中,德性统一论一直为人们聚讼不已。它最早由苏格拉底提出,亚里士多德在修正苏格拉底观点的基础上,强调任何一种德性都蕴含明智,如果一个人拥有了明智,那么他将拥有全部德性。然而,这一命题在当代面临“德性非统一”或“有限统一”观点的挑战,前者试图否定诸德性之间的关联,消解德性之间的统一,后者易陷入情境主义的泥沼,解构德性的实在性,无法捍卫德性统一论的正确性。事实上,无论是德性非统一论还是德性有限统一论,都严重背离了亚里士多德对德性概念、诸德性统一论问题的理解。重新回顾亚里士多德的德性统一论命题,对于重新思考德性伦理的当代复兴与促进道德教育的发展具有重要意义。
In the contemporary revival of moral ethics,“the unity of virtues”has been a controversial issue for a long time.This proposition was first put forward by Socrates,and Aristotle,on the basis of revising Socratesviews,proposed that any virtue contains wisdom,and if a person has wisdom,then he will have all the virtues.However,this proposition is challenged by the argument of“non-unity of virtues”or“limited unity of virtues”.The former tries to negate the relation between virtues and dispel the unity of virtues,while the latter is prone to fall into the bog of situationism and deconstruct the reality of virtues,and cannot defend the correctness of the theory of unity of virtues.In fact,both the the non-unity theory of virtues and the limited unity theory of virtues seriously deviate from Aristotle's understanding on the concept of virtue and the unity of virtues.Reviewing Aristotle's proposition of unity of virtues is of great significance for promoting the development of moral education and rethinking the contemporary revival of virtue ethics.
作者
林晓娴
LIN Xiaoxian(School of Marxism,Jimei University)
出处
《当代中国价值观研究》
2024年第5期33-44,共12页
Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values
基金
福建省社会科学基金青年项目“习近平总书记关于立德树人重要论述在福建的孕育与实践研究”(FJ2023C004)的阶段性成果。