论萨特从现象学本体论向本真伦理学的“转变”——以自欺和本真性范畴为中心线索

On Sartre's“Transformation”from Phenomenological Ontology to Authentic Ethics:With the Categories of Bad Faith and Authenticity as the Central Clue

自欺和本真性是联结萨特本体论哲学与伦理学思想的理论媒介之一。在《存在与虚无》中,萨特通过意识的个体自由与实存特质勾勒出意识于实然的本体论层面上始终寻求成为自因存在,并由此与世界、自身和他人处于一种自欺的、非本真的关系中。但在《伦理学笔记》中,他侧重于围绕意识和他人的共同自由与社会性共存,构建出意识于应然的道德层面上寻求人类自由本身的转向,并借此使意识与世界、自身和他人处于一种积极共在的、本真的关系中。其中,自欺作为一个兼含本体论和伦理学意蕴的核心范畴,既通过其双重维度而揭露出意识本身所固有的内在二元性,又凭借其自身所蕴含的道德意蕴推动意识踏上本真之路。在一种本真伦理学的建构中,意识既从自然性的意愿自在—自为“转变”到道德性的意愿自由,又从自然性地占有他人“转变”到道德性地意愿他人。

The pair of categories of bad faith and authenticity is one of the theoretical media connecting Sartre's ontological philosophy and ethical thought.In Being and Nothingness,by mainly focusing on the individual freedom and existence of consciousness,Sartre outlines that consciousness always seeks to be a causa sui at the ontological level of fact,and thus is in a bad faith and inauthentic relationship with the world,itself and others.But in Notebooks for an Ethics,by mainly focusing on the common freedom and social coexistence of consciousness and others,Sartre constructs that consciousness turns to the quest for human freedom itself on a moral level,and thereby is in a positive coexistence and authentic relationship with the world,itself and others.Among them,bad faith is a core category with both ontological and ethical implications.It not only reveals the inherent duality of consciousness itself through its dual dimensions,but also promotes consciousness to pursue a authentic path by virtue of its own moral implication.In the construction of a authentic ethics,consciousness not only“converts”from the natural will of in-itself-for-itself to the moral will of freedom,but also“converts”from the natural possession of others to the moral will of others.