计及电力现货机会成本的构网型储能电站调频辅助服务竞价出清双层博弈模型

A Bi-level Game Model for Frequency Regulation Ancillary Service Bidding and Clearing of Grid-forming Energy Storage Stations Considering Opportunity Cost of Electricity Spot Trading

构网型储能是保障新型电力系统安全稳定运行的重要灵活性资源,作为独立市场主体提供调频辅助服务,对解决系统调频能力短缺问题具有现实意义。该文通过构建双层博弈模型,研究构网型储能在调频辅助市场中的竞价交易行为和市场出清过程。首先,明确构网型储能参与调频辅助市场的整体架构。然后,将构网型储能电站作为独立的竞价主体,建立计及电力现货机会成本的构网型储能电站调频辅助服务双层博弈模型,调度中心作为上层领导者追求购电成本最小化,构网型储能电站作为下层跟随者则以实现自身收益最大为目标,双方形成主从博弈关系。最后,通过算例验证所提出模型的合理性与有效性,并探讨构网型储能电站申报及市场出清参数对结果的具体影响,为构网型储能的市场运行提供模型支持。

Grid-forming energy storage is an important flexible and adjustable resource that ensures the safe and stable operation of the new-type power system.As an independent market entity,grid-forming energy storage provides frequency regulation ancillary services,which is a crucial approach to addressing the insufficient frequency regulation capacity of the new-type power system.This paper utilizes a bi-level game model to analyze the bidding behavior and market clearing process of grid-forming energy storage in the frequency regulation ancillary market.Firstly,a whole framework for grid-forming energy storage participating in the frequency regulation ancillary market is constructed.Then,considering grid-forming energy storage power stations as independent bidding entities,a bi-level game model for frequency regulation ancillary services is established,which takes into account the opportunity cost of electricity spot trading.In this model,the dispatch center acts as the upper-level leader aiming to minimize the power purchase cost,while the grid-forming energy storage power stations act as the lower-level followers aiming to maximize their own profits.Finally,through case studies,the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed model are verified,and a comprehensive analysis of the impact of relevant parameters in the bidding and clearing of grid-forming energy storage power stations on the market clearing results is presented.