政府补贴下老旧小区加装电梯PPP模式研究

PPP Mode of Installing Elevators in Old Residential Areas with Government Subsidy

随着我国人口老龄化的不断加重以及居民对于生活质量要求的逐渐提高,作为老旧小区改造的重要环节之一的加装电梯工作也受到重视。但是,目前以业主自筹为主的融资模式给加装电梯项目的实施造成了障碍,同时,大量财政补贴也给政府财政造成了压力。针对这些问题,本文提出引入市场机制,即形成一个社会资本方参与的PPP融资模式,研究此模式中政府补贴的形式及规模能否提高社会资本方和居民的参与意愿、引发补贴陷阱,构建了加装电梯项目建设和运营两阶段的演化博弈模型,在此基础上,探究了模型参数变化后对社会资本方和居民双方的博弈策略影响,并对模型进行了敏感性检验。结果显示,构建的PPP融资模式能够提高社会资本方和居民的参与意愿,且建设期补贴能够显著促进社会资本方的策略选择,而运营期补贴则会促进居民的策略选择;但声誉激励补贴的存在会导致补贴陷阱,若存在社会资本方和居民同时补贴的情况时,给予居民的运营期补贴比例需达到一定程度时,项目才会成功运行。

With the increasing of aging and the gradual improvement of residents’requirements for quality of life,the installation of elevators,as one of the important links in the renovation of old residential areas,has also received attention.However,the current owner-financed financing model has caused obstacles to the implementation of elevator projects,and a large number of financial subsidies have also caused pressure on government finances.In view of these problems,this paper proposes a market mechanism,that is,to form a PPP financing model in which social capital parties participate.In order to study whether the form and scale of government subsidies in this model will increase the willingness of social capital and residents to participate and lead to subsidy traps,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with two stages of construction and operation of elevators.Then,in order to explore the impact of parameter changes on the strategies of social capital and residents,sensitivity tests were carried out on the model.The results show that the PPP financing model constructed in this paper can improve the participation willingness of social capital and residents,and the construction period subsidy can significantly promote the strategic choice of social capital,while the operation period subsidy can promote the strategic choice of residents.The existence of reputational incentive subsidies will lead to subsidy traps.If the social capital and the residents are subsidized at the same time,the project will be successfully run only when the proportion of the operation period subsidy given to the residents is large to a certain extent.