ESG评级分歧与管理层异常积极语调——基于管理层讨论与分析的文本研究

ESG Rating Divergence and Management’s Abnormally Positive Tone——Textual Analysis Based on Management Discussion and Analysis

环境、社会和治理(ESG)逐渐成为广受认同的责任投资理念和价值投资标准,但ESG评级分歧却对资本市场产生了不利影响。本文以2015-2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究ESG评级分歧对企业管理层异常积极语调的影响。研究结果显示,ESG评级分歧提高了管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)异常积极语调。基于前景理论的机制检验发现,管理层较高的损失感知和风险偏好程度以及较低的公司治理水平会加剧ESG评级分歧对MD&A异常积极语调的不利影响。异质性检验结果表明,ESG评级分歧对处于较低社会信任度地区、对ESG评级分歧敏感度较高、管理层能力较弱企业的MD&A异常积极语调影响明显。经济后果检验发现,管理层通过提高MD&A异常积极语调应对ESG评级分歧能够减少媒体负面报道和投资不足问题,但也加剧了资本市场的信息不对称程度。本文拓展了ESG评级分歧经济后果的研究边界,对推动构建企业ESG信息披露标准体系、增强企业风险识别能力、促进公司治理水平提高以及更好地发挥资本市场信息中介的作用具有启示意义。

ESG rating divergence may negatively impact firms and capital markets,and such divergence can increase stakeholders’perceptions of uncertainty and potential risks.Thus,this paper aims to explore whether management discussion and analysis(MD&A)tone is strategically manipulated in response to stakeholders’unfavorable expectations.Based on a sample of A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2022,this paper examines the impact of firms’ESG rating divergence on MD&A abnormally positive tone.The results show that ESG rating divergence increases MD&A abnormally positive tone.This finding holds after considering endogeneity issues and conducting a series of robustness tests.In terms of economic significance,for every one standard deviation increase in ESG rating divergence,MD&A abnormally positive tone increases by about 3.4%standard deviation.Based on prospect theory,the paper conducts a mechanism test from the perspectives of loss perception,risk preference,and corporate governance,respectively,and finds that management’s higher degrees of loss perception and risk preference and lower corporate governance level exacerbate the adverse effect of ESG rating divergence on MD&A abnormally positive tone.The heterogeneity test indicates that ESG rating divergence has a pronounced effect on MD&A abnormally positive tone for firms located in regions with lower social trust,and those having higher sensitivity to ESG rating divergence and lower management competence.The economic consequences test reveals that management’s response to ESG rating divergence by increasing MD&A abnormally positive tone reduces negative media coverage and underinvestment.However,it also increases the optimism bias and error of analysts’earnings forecasts,exacerbating the information asymmetry in capital markets.The possible marginal contributions are as follows.First,this paper complements studies of the economic consequences of ESG rating divergence.Existing studies focus on the impact of ESG rating divergence on the behavior of stakeholders,while this paper emphasizes the perspective of firms’strategic disclosure behaviors and effectively complements existing studies about disclosure quality.Second,this paper enriches the research on the factors influencing MD&A abnormally positive tone.Based on the perspective of infomediary ratings and the analytical framework of prospect theory,this paper finds further evidence that management responds to unfavorable external expectations through strategically manipulating MD&A tone.Finally,the findings offer valuable policy implications.Specifically,policymakers should continue to promote the construction of a standard system for corporate ESG disclosure.Regulators should enhance the identification of firms’risks and facilitate improvements in corporate governance.Capital market participants should be cautious about the information released by information intermediaries.