政府参与集体经营性建设用地入市增值收益分配的理论依据及优化策略

Theoretical basis and optimization strategy of government’s participation in distribution of value-added income from collective-operated construction land transfer

集体经营性建设用地入市深化阶段,稳定政府土地收益预期并发挥有为政府的作用至关重要。文中以政府参与入市为切入点,系统探讨政府参与入市增值收益分配的理论依据,构建入市增值收益分配合作博弈模型,检视各地区政府参与入市增值收益实际分配的合理性,并提出帕累托改进的优化分配方案。结果表明:1)政府直接或间接投资产生的正外部性及其社会经济职能是其参与入市收益分配的理论逻辑。2)集体经营性建设用地入市实际收益分配存在主体、用途和区域异质性,各地区政府参与入市收益分配比例上限均未超过50%,但下限则低于20%,政府在各用途入市宗地上的收益分配波动幅度达10%-20%。3)“政府+农村集体+农户个体”三方联盟有利于结果公平和机会公平,该联盟入市增值收益存在帕累托改进,优化后的政府收益分配比例均在30%左右,且在各用途入市宗地上获取增值收益的波动幅度为3%以内。

To stabilize the government's land income expectation is very important for government to play a promising role in deepening reform of collective-operated construction land transfer.We discussed the theoretical basis of government's participation in the distribution of value-added income in the market,used the Shapley model to examine the rationality of the actual distribution of the value-added income of local governments,and proposed an optimal allocation scheme in line with the Pareto improvement.The results show that:1)The positive external benefit generated by direct or indirect investment and the social and economic functions of governments are the reasons that local governments can participate in the distribution.2)There is heterogeneity in the distribution of actual benefits from the entry of collective-operated construction land into the market in terms of subject,purpose,and region.The upper limit of the proportion of income for local governments does not exceed 50%,but the lower limit is less than 20%,and the fluctuation range of income from various types of land for government is 10%-20%.3) The tripartite alliance of government,rural collective,and individual farmer is conducive to fairness of results and opportunities,and the value-added income is in line with the Pareto improvement strategy,and the optimized government income distribution ratio is about 30%,the fluctuation range is controlled within 3%.