摘要
所有者 (学校 )与企业经营者拥有的信息不对称 ;(监督 ,{不作假 ,作假 } )是子博弈精炼纳什均衡 ;学校应该同时采取监督和激励来协调与经营者的目标。
The information which possessed by proprietary man (college) and enterprise manager is NOT symmetry; (supervise, {not making false, making false}) is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; the proprietary man (college) must use both supervising and inspiring in order to coordinate the objective between managers.
出处
《西南师范大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2002年第6期41-44,共4页
Journal of Southwest China Normal University(Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
后勤社会化
监督激励机制
博弈
Rear\|service marketwise
supervising and inspiring system
Game .