政府监管与绿色生产多阶段博弈行为

Multi-stage Game of Government Supervision and Green Manufacture

针对绿色生产效益的不同发展趋势和不同发展水平,通过多阶段博弈分析方法研究政府与绿色生产制造商之间的决策行为及其互动关系,探明不同情形下政府监督行为对绿色生产的影响机理,对政府促进绿色生产提出相应有效的政策建议。结论显示:当绿色生产效益呈上升趋势,政府应逐步降低监督检查力度,同时加大处罚力度;当绿色生产效益呈下降趋势,政府应逐步加大监管检查力度,但加大处罚力度不一定利于绿色生产,政府应为改善绿色生产效益创造有利政策环境,提升企业核心竞争力。

Based on different development trends and various development levels of green productive benefit,the decisionmaking and interaction between green manufacturer and government are studied by the analysis method of multi-stage game.Then the mechanisms that the government supervision has an influence on green production under variant scenarios are explored.Lastly some corresponding and effective policy suggestions on how government promotes green production are put forward.It is shown that when green productive profit is uptrend,government must step down the probability of inspection,meanwhile increase fines;when green productive profit is downtrend,government must increase the probability of inspection step by step,however it isn't always good for green production to increase fines,so government shall create a favorable police environment for improving green productive benefit,which enhances core competitiveness of the enterprise.