工程监理主体行为激励机理的数理分析

The Mathematical Analysis of Incentive Mechanism of Subject Behavior on Construction Supervision

运用博弈论中多任务委托代理模型及信息经济学理论,系统地分析了工程施工监理的主体行为激励机理;在多任务委托代理模型的基础上,结合工程施工监理特点,建立了基于理性博弃理论且符合工程监理工作实际的随机规划模型,得出了描述工程监理中不相互独立的六项基本任务之间相互关系的关联矩阵,并阐述了关联矩阵中两两对称任务的相互关系,针对目前工程建设项目参与人之间信息不对称现象,分析得出了工程监理最佳激励模式。

Applying multitask principal-agent model in the game theory and information economics theory,the paper systematically analyzes the incentive mechanism of subject behavior on construction supervision.Based on the multitask principal-agent model and combined with the characteristics of construction supervision,it builds stochastic programming model,which is based on rational game theory and conforms to the fact of construction supervision work.We can obtain the incidence matrix which describes the relationship among the non-symmetry six basic tasks in the engineering supervision,and expound the relationship of the two two symmetrical task in correlation matrix and get the best incentive mode of engineering supervision aiming at the information asymmetry phenomenon among participants in engineering construction at present.