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耐用品垄断厂商易耗部件兼容策略 被引量:4

Compatible Strategy of Easy-to-wear Accessories for Durable Goods Monopolist
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摘要 从消费者效用角度,利用市场出清条件和对比分析方法研究了易耗部件兼容性策略对耐用品垄断厂商决策的影响问题。结论表明,通常情况下,耐用品垄断厂商采取易耗部件兼容策略时的最优收益大于其采取易耗部件不兼容策略时的最优收益;耐用品价值的降低、耐用品耐用度的降低以及耐用品用户满意度的降低都会分别增强耐用品垄断厂商采用易耗部件兼容策略所受到的激励;且易耗部件每阶段更换次数的增加也会加大垄断厂商采取易耗部件兼容策略的激励。针对上述结论给出了相应的例证分析。 In the perspective of consumer utility,this paper studies the compatibility strategy of Easy-to-wear accessories for durable goods monopolist by using the condition of market-clearing and comparative analysis method.The conclusions show that,under normal circumstances,the optimal revenue of durable goods monopolist with compatibility strategy on Easy-to-wear accessories is greater than that with incompatible strategy;the reduction of the durable goods' value,the reduction of the durability of the durable goods and the reduction of their user satisfaction will respectively enhance the incentives of durable goods monopolist to adopt Easy-to-wear accessories compatible strategies;and the increment of replacement times of Easy-to-wear accessories in every stage will enhance the incentives of durable goods monopolist to adopt compatible strategies too.Finally,examples analysis is made according to the above corresponding conclusions.
出处 《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2014年第10期133-137,共5页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家科技支撑计划子课题(2011BAJ07B02-1)
关键词 消费者效用 耐用品 易耗部件 兼容 Consumer Utility Durable Goods Easy-to-Wear Accessories Compatible
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