供应链协调的最优销售价格激励契约设计

Design Optimal Retail Price Incentive Contract of Supply Chain Coordination

根据信息经济学中的最优激励理论,探讨了采用最优激励契约激励零售商制定合理的零售价格以实现供应链协调的可行性。考虑了一条只生产新产品的两级供应链和一条同时生产新产品与再制造品的两级供应链分别利用最优激励契约实现供应链协调的契约设计,建立和求解了动态博弈模型,求得了生产销售单一产品的制造商和提供两种相互竞争的制造与再制造产品的制造商分别对零售商制定零售价格的最优激励契约,即最优销售价格激励契约。研究结果发现,这种最优销售价格激励契约可以实现在约束条件下单产品供应链的完美协调,最优销售价格激励契约可以实现竞争性供应链的协调。

Based on optimal incentive theory of information economics,this paper discusses the feasibility of using optimal incentive contract to incentive retailers to develop a reasonable retail price in order to achieve supply chain coordination.This research studies how to achieve supply chain coordination by using optimal incentive contract in two two-stage supply chains,one only produces and sells a single product,and the other simultaneously produces new and re-manufacture goods.To illustrate this issue,dynamic game models are built to develop the optimal retail price incentive contract of two supply chains mentioned above.The results have found that the optimal retail price incentive contract can achieve perfect coordination under the constraint conditions of a single product supply chain,and the optimal retail price incentive contract can also achieve a competitive supply chain coordination.