基于信息共享的供应商协同产品设计机制

The Mechanism of Supplier Collaborative Product Design Based on Information Sharing

供应商参与产品设计时,供应商成本信息的不对称会导致制造商对产品最终定价偏离最优值,使得制造商利润受损。研究显示通过供应商成本信息共享,制造商可以达到利润最大化,但信息共享不能给供应商带来更多的利润,因此供应商不愿意共享成本信息。为了促使供应商参与信息共享,信息共享参与方应投资建立安全的通信系统,以保证共享信息不被泄露。同时引入纳什讨价还价模型建立一个公平的利润划拨机制,该机制使得最后的利润划分只取决于各参与方的议价能力,与通信系统投资大小无关。

When suppliers are involved in new product design projects,suppliers' cost information asymmetry would lead to the deviation of the last price of the product decided by the manufacturers from the optimal one,which will hunt the manufacturers' profits.With the suppliers' cost information sharing,the manufacturers can get the maximum profit,but the suppliers wouldn't get the more profits from the information sharing.So the suppliers wouldn't share their cost information with the manufacturers.In order to let the enterprises in the supply chain share their information with each other,the participants should invest in establishing the security communications systems to ensure the information wouldn't be leaked.In this paper,based on Nash bargain model we propose a fair profit allocation scheme,in which the participants' profits only depend on their bargain abilities and are independent of the communication systems investment.