什么影响了地方政府住房限购决策?——考虑政策异质性的中央与地方政府博弈

What Affects the Housing Purchase Restriction Decision of Local Governments?——The Game between Central and Local Government Considering Policy Heterogeneity

中央与地方政府之间的博弈行为在我国住房限购政策实施中起到了重要作用。本文构建了中央与地方政府在住房限购政策实施上的博弈模型,理论分析表明中央政府发现并惩罚地方政府不采取限购政策的概率越高,地方政府通过"阳奉阴违"欺骗中央政府的概率越低,地方政府执行限购政策的概率越大。在此基础上,利用2010—2013年我国70个大中城市面板数据进行的实证检验表明,房地产开发活动越活跃、行政级别越高、GDP增长率越低、财政收支缺口越小的城市执行限购政策的概率更高,而房价增长率的影响则不显著;该结论在进一步考虑了住房限购政策实施时间强度与综合强度两方面异质性的实证检验中仍然是成立的。因此,住房限购政策在我国的实施面临体制困境,难以作为一种常用的房地产市场调控手段,改革当前财税体制与协调好中央与地方政府间的利益是住房限购政策切实实现其目标的重要保证。

The objective of this paper is to illustrate and examine how the game between central and local governments affects the implementation of housing purchase restriction policy. The theoretical study employing game theory and empirical study using the panel data of China's 70 large and medium-sized cities from 2012 to 2013 are conducted respectively. The theoretical study shows when the probability that central government finds and punishes the non-cooperative behaviors of local government is high,and the probability that local governments can deceive central government is lower,local governments tend to implement housing purchase restriction policy with a higher probability. And the conclusions are confirmed in the empirical study and also supported by the further robust tests considering policy heterogeneity. The key limitation of this study is that it focuses solely on the game between central and local governments,while neglecting the interactions among local governments. Another difficulty is to measure the policy heterogeneity more precisely. The conclusions derived from the study can provide some insights for policy makers including central and local government to diagnose the problems in the implementation of housing purchase restriction policy. Besides,this study reveals that the housing purchase restriction policy is not a feasible tool to regulate housing market for a long term and it is more important to coordinate the benefits between central and local government in order to reach the goal of housing purchase restriction policy. Different from the common qualitative studies,this study examines the mechanism in the implementation of housing purchase restriction policy using econometric methods. Besides,through constructing a quantitative evaluation system,this study incorporates the policy heterogeneity in terms of time and comprehensive scores in the empirical study,thus the research results are more robust.