社会绩效、一票否决与官员晋升——来自中国城市的证据

Performance in Social Issue Areas and Promotion of Municipal Leaders in Contemporary China

本文连接了"官员晋升锦标赛理论"研究与干部考核和选拔制度研究,全面分析了经济绩效、社会绩效、政治关系网络、一票否决类指标完成情况对市级领导人职位变动和升迁速度的影响。研究表明:官员政治激励结构存在异质化的特征,影响市委书记和市长晋升的因素不同,社会政策领域的实绩与市长的晋升概率和速度相关,而工作实绩与市委书记的晋升没有关联;与现有部分文献相一致,经济增长绩效无论是市委书记还是市长,在晋升与否与晋升速度上都没有影响;同时,本文第一次系统检验了维护社会稳定这一一票否决指标对地方干部晋升的影响,在维稳方面的实绩并不会影响市委书记和市长最终的职位变动,但会滞后提拔的时间。

Drawn on the content analysis of over 600 local cadre evaluation regulations and statistical analysis of the career movement of prefectural-level leaders between 2003 and 2010, this paper examines the effect of economic performance, personal connection, and performance in social policy areas and social stability on local leaders' promotion probability and speed. It shows that:first, for municipal party chiefs and mayors, economic performance is not associated with the promotion probability or speed; second, whereas for municipal party chiefs, the level of localities' wealth and personal connection is positively associated with promotion probability, for mayors, age and performance in social policy areas matters more; third, performance in maintaining social stability does not affect the promotion prospect but delay career advancement for both municipal party chiefs and mayors. In addition to temporal and spatial variation, this paper also finds that evaluation criteria and political incentive structure for municipal party chiefs and mayors are different.