摘要
针对供货商是否接受新订货商的订货的决策问题,建立了完全信息扩展博弈模型·由于供货商与订货商之间是一种长期博弈的关系,因而进一步建立了以此完全信息扩展博弈为原博弈的无限次重复博弈模型,通过对它的分析,发现供货商是否接受新订货商的订货取决于新订货商的订货是否达到一定的数量·
?For the decision whether a supplier should accept the order of a new buyer or not, a model of extensive game with perfect information was developed to analyse this problem. Because of the long period relation between a supplier and a buyer, an infinitely repeated game model was presented based on the model of extensive game with perfect information. The analysis of the models reveals whether a supplier accepts the orders of a new buyer or not relies on the quantity of commodity which a new buyer orders.
出处
《东北大学学报(自然科学版)》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2002年第12期1200-1202,共3页
Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)
基金
辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(98102005)