摘要
以基础设施建设为背景 ,针对BOT项目的有限追索权融资方式 ,建立了贷方和项目公司之间的风险收益分配模型 ,根据委托代理的理论和思想 ,分析了贷方和项目公司的风险态度和风险收益的分配问题 ,得到了使贷方和项目公司的收益同时达到最优的收益平衡条件 ,解决了贷方和项目公司之间的利益冲突问题 。
With the background of developments of infrastructure, aiming at limited resource financing to a BOT (build operate transfer) project a model of risk revenue allocation between the lenders and the BOT project company is established. Based on the theory of principal and agent, the problems about risk attitude and risk revenue allocation of the two sides are analyzed, the condition of revenue equilibrium is found, in which the revenue of the two sides is optimal synchronously, thus solving the revenue conflict between them and validating the effectiveness and availability of the BOT financing mode.
出处
《东南大学学报(自然科学版)》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2002年第6期920-924,共5页
Journal of Southeast University:Natural Science Edition
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 0 710 4 9)