产能过剩的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Overcapacity

企业去产能是一个囚徒困境问题。本文认为,政府对去产能进行补贴,能够改变博弈的支付,从而改变企业的纳什均衡解。恰当数额的补贴能使博弈脱离囚徒困境状态,过度补贴会导致去产能失败。为了让市场自发去产能,政策补贴的数额必须经过精确测算。本文对此给出了政策建议和改善措施。

Enterprise production capacity is a prisoner's dilemma. This paper argues that the government subsidizes the production capacity and can change the payment of the game, thus changing the firm's Nash equilibrium. Appropriate amount of subsidies can make the game out of the prisoner's dilemma, excessive subsidies will lead to failure to produce capacity. In order to allow the market to spontaneous production capacity, the amount of policy subsidies must be accurately measured. This article gives policy recommendations and improvement measures.