美国应对核扩散的行为逻辑

The Logic of America’s Response to Nuclear Proliferation

美国决策者对核扩散国核扩散的'威胁认知'和对核扩散国的'关系目标'决定了美国对核扩散国的核不扩散政策。其中,威胁认知为首要变量,它决定了美国对核扩散国核扩散的基本态度,即干预与否;关系目标为次要变量,它决定了美国对核扩散国核扩散的干预程度,即是否对核扩散国采取强制核不扩散举措。当为'低威胁认知'时,美国不会干预核扩散国发展核武器;当美国决策者对核扩散国核扩散的威胁认知为'高威胁认知'且对核扩散国的关系目标为'无核优先'时,美国不仅会干预核扩散国发展核武器,更会采取诸如制裁以及威胁抛弃这样的强制核不扩散举措来干预核扩散国发展核武器;当为'高威胁认知'且关系目标为'关系优先'时,美国虽会干预核扩散国的核扩散,但不会采取强制核不扩散举措。在应对盟国以及与美国关系友好国家的核扩散时,美国总是试图在维护美国的地缘政治利益和核不扩散利益之间寻求平衡;当两者发生冲突时,维护美国的地缘政治利益往往成为美国决策者最优先的战略考量。

The U.S.policy makers’perceptions of the threat of nuclear proliferation by proliferators and their goals of relationship determine U.S.nonproliferation policy toward the proliferators.Among them,the threat perception is the primary variable,which determines America’s basic attitude towards proliferators:intervene or not;the goal of the relationship is a secondary variable that determines the degree of U.S.intervention in proliferators,i.e.,whether to impose nonproliferation measures on them.When the threat perception is low,the United States will not interfere in the nuclear development of the proliferators.When U.S.policy makers perceive the threat of proliferation as high,and the goal of their relationship is'denuclearization priority,'the United States will interfere in their proliferation of nuclear weapons by enforcing nonproliferation measures,such as sanctions and threatening to abandon the proliferator.When the threat perception is high and the goal of the relationship is'relationship first,'the United States will intervene in the proliferation,but will not take coercive nuclear non-proliferation measures.In dealing with the proliferation issues of its allies and friendly countries,U.S.has always been seeking to balance its geopolitical interests with its non-proliferation interests.When conflicting with each other,the goal of safeguarding its geopolitical interests usually becomes the top strategic consideration for American policy makers.