IMF《成员国政策双边监督的决定》评析及中国的对策——以中美人民币汇率争议的解决为视角

A Review on the IMF’s Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members’Policies and China’s Response——from the Perspective of the Settlement of Sino-US Exchange Rate Dispute

2007年IMF执董会出台的《成员国政策双边监督的决定》是IMF三十年来对成员国汇率政策监督的经验总结和适应国际金融市场变化的新规则,也是IMF后续改革的风向标。新决定对1977年的《关于汇率政策监督的决定》作了重大的修改,制订了更为严格的监督纪律,将'外部稳定'列为统领汇率双边监督的组织原则,且其中部分内容被认为直指中国。这种修改虽增加了我国调整汇率的外在压力,但也从另一方面给我国提供了相应的抗辩空间。

The 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Members’Policies is a summing-up of IMF’s last three decades’experience of surveillance over its members’exchange rate policies and is the new rule adapting to economic globalization,which is also the vane of the IMF’upcoming reforms.The 2007 Decision has made significant changes on the"Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies"(the"1977 decision")and set out external stability as the organizing principle for surveillance and made surveillance discipline more strict.Part of the 2007 Decision is considered to direct at China.Although this modification increases the external pressure on China to adjust its exchange rate,it also gives China corre-sponding space for defense.