摘要
为了追求投资保护的最大化,投资者可通过在第三国设立的中间公司来'选购'第三国与东道国间投资条约以寻求保护。而一般国际法并不禁止投资者'选购'条约,揭开公司面纱制度与善意原则对于限制'条约选购'现象而言作用有限。缔约国如希望对'条约选购'予以限制,须在国际投资条约文本中予以明确。限制'条约选购'可采取的应对模式包括限制'投资者'的定义、订入拒绝授惠条款、嗣后联合解释以及修改或取消投资者与国家间争端仲裁条款。中国应审慎评估和应对投资者的'条约选购',从而将其不利影响控制到最小。
To maximize the investment protection,an investor may deliberately seek to"shop for"the benefits of a particular investment treaty by structuring its investments through a third country that has more favorable treaty terms with the target host state.However,there is no constraint to treaty shopping of investors in general international law.And the role of piercing the corporate veil principle and good faith principle in restricting treaty shopping is highly limited.Contracting states shall make it clear in international investment treaties if they wish to restrict treaty shopping.Effective counter-measures contracting states may take when confronted with treaty shopping include:clarifying the definition of investor,incorporating denial of benefits clause,making a joint ex post interpretation and amending or excluding the investor-state arbitration clause.China should evaluate and deal with treaty shopping with care in order to minimize its adverse impacts.
出处
《国际经济法学刊》
CSSCI
2013年第2期121-146,共26页
Journal of International Economic Law