摘要
2018年3月,特朗普总统援引模糊的安全例外条款规避WTO对关税的限制,对WTO争端解决机制乃至整个贸易体制的可靠性与合法性发起了新的挑战。WTO安全例外条款作为WTO法律机制之一,至今仍缺乏权威的条款解释、明确的适用规则以及可参考的判例。本文结合WTO实践经验与学术成果,提出互补性方案:划分安全利益类别,保证适用的灵活性;设立援引的一般性限制,保证适用的普遍性。同时,国际法基本原则应被视为最终救济手段,维护世界经贸秩序。
In March 2018,based on Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act,President Trump attempts to invoke the WTO security exception to protect national interests.Such invocation poses new challenges to the reliability and legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and even the whole trading system.As an indispensable tool of the WTO,GATT XXI has no authorized interpretations,no explicit applying rules,and no precedents.Based on practical experience and academic development,two complementary approaches are practicable to limit the application of security exception.The differentiation of security interests embraces flexibility,while the establishment of general treaty restrictions indicates efficiency.Meanwhile,the fundamental principles of international law shall serve as the last resort.In all,utilizing appropriate tools to restrict the invocation of security exception will be of tremendous importance to the orchestration of the world trade system.
出处
《国际经济法学刊》
CSSCI
2019年第2期80-92,共13页
Journal of International Economic Law
关键词
WTO安全例外条款
基本安全利益
自决权
贸易战
Security Exception
Essential Security Interests
Self-Judging Nature
Trade War