摘要
随着金融全球化的发展,三元悖论这一国际金融的经典理论受到挑战,核心问题在于资本自由流动下,浮动汇率制度能否保证货币政策独立性。本文在开放经济条件下建立一个包含信贷抵押约束的DSGE模型,论证在资本自由流动下浮动汇率制度无法调节以资产价格与通胀为主的金融跨境传染,无法保证货币政策的独立空间与政策效果,三元悖论变成二元悖论。因此,资本流动宏观审慎管理与货币政策国际协调机制是保证货币政策独立性的关键。
As one of the classic financial theories for years,the'Impossible Trinity'or'Trilemma'is now challenged by financial synchronization.The key question is whether floating exchange rate regime can guarantee the independence and effectiveness of monetary policy with free capital mobility.This paper establishes an open economy DSGE framework with foreign and domestic collateral constraint.The independence and effectiveness of monetary policy would be affected by foreign credit tightening,which cannot be accommodated by floating exchange rate regime.Evidence from DSGE model confirms that macro-prudential management and international monetary policy coordination can obtain macroeconomic equilibrium and policy independence.
作者
刘一楠
徐雅婷
Liu Yinan;Xu Yating
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第8期25-34,共10页
Studies of International Finance
基金
中国博士后科学基金资助(2019M650992)
关键词
二元悖论
信贷抵押约束
浮动汇率
Dilemma
Collateral Constraint
Floating Exchange Rate Regime