摘要
基于产品生命周期理论,可将两种创新程度不同的新产品间的竞争分为两个阶段。通过分析制造商与零售商间不同的博弈关系发现:在市场竞争缓和的第一阶段,如果占据主导地位的制造商愿与零售商形成Nash博弈关系,则能够降低产品的最优零售价格,提高市场需求量,并最终有利于双方利润的增长;创新程度不同的两种新产品间,某一方提升自身产品的创新度,不仅不会降低另一方的市场需求量,反而能够促进双方需求量的共同增长。在竞争激烈的第二阶段,制造商与零售商组成两方联盟能够提升自身产品的市场占有率,增加联盟的总利润,但这同时也降低了制造商的利润。
Based on the product life cycle theory,the competition between the two types of new products with different innovation degrees can be divided into two stages. By analyzing the game relationship of manufacturers and retailers in two stages of the competition,we found that the optimal retail prices of products will be lower and market demand will be greater than that in Manufacturer-dominate Stackelberg game at the early stage of the competition if the dominant manufacturers form Nash game with the retailer. Furthermore,in the market formed by two new products with different innovation degrees,when one party improves the innovation degree of own product,it does not reduce the demand of the other party’s products but can promote the increase of the two products’ demands. Finally,it is observed that the two-parties alliance of manufacturer and retailer can significantly increase the market share of own product at the late stage of the competition,but reduce the profit of manufacturers.
作者
李振东
张慧颖
LI Zhendong;ZHANG Huiying(Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou,China;Tianjin University,Tianjin,China)
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第3期456-464,共9页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(11BZZ028)
天津市哲学社会科学规划课题资助重点项目(TJGL15-005)
天津市教育委员会社会科学资助重大项目(2014ZD14)
