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企业经营者管理行为的隐性控制机制研究

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摘要 文章研究了在公司内部如何通过合适的隐性激励制度安排,使得经理人与股东、员工的目标尽可能一致,从而实现经理人的自我约束和控制。采用这种机制,基于低成本地激励员工的考虑,经理人在追求自身利益的同时也实现了公司长远发展。当公司有一个稳定的经营环境时,这种隐性控制机制和股东财富最大化的目标是一致的。但是,当公司面临重组等经营环境的重大变化时,这种机制将减少公司的价值,这时需要引入外部治理机制。模型还能够对经理人员的风险规避、抵制重组等行为以及公司治理的国际差异等提供新的经济学解释。
作者 吴勇 朱卫东
出处 《公司治理评论》 2010年第1期61-72,共12页 Review of Corporate Governance
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参考文献12

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