风险规避零售商在资金约束供应链中的融资渠道选择策略

Financing Channel Selection Policies of the Risk-averse Retailer in a Capital-constrained Supply Chain

研究了一个风险中性的供应商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的资金约束供应链系统,应用CVaR风险度量准则来衡量零售商的风险规避程度,建立了银行借款及商业信用两种情景下的供应链博弈模型并得出最优订货量及批发价,进一步分析了零售商风险规避程度对供应链均衡解及融资渠道选择的影响。研究发现供应商是否提供商业信用融资给零售商与其风险规避程度相关,当零售商风险态度趋于中性时,让零售商选择银行借款而不提供商业信用融资是供应商更优的选择;而当零售商风险态度趋于规避时,供应商提供商业信用融资给零售商反而是更有利可图的。

A supply chain system was investigated,which consists of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer and where the retailer is capital constrained.The Conditional Value-atRisk(CVaR)method was adopted to measure the retailer’s risk aversion,and two scenarios were designed:bank financing and trade credit financing.The optimal order quantity and wholesale price under both modes were obtained.The effects of the retailer’s risk aversion on supply chain equilibrium solutions and channel selection policies were further analyzed.The results show that whether suppliers provide trade credit financing to retailer is related to the retailer’s risk aversion.When the retailer’s risk attitude tends to be risk-neutral,it is better for the supplier to choose bank loans rather than trade credit financing.When retailer’s risk attitude tends to be risk-neutral,it is more profitable for the supplier to provide trade credit financing to the retailer.