摘要
针对零售商对制造商进行投资减排产生的溢出效应问题,构建一个制造商、两个零售商组成的两级供应链,研究单一零售商投资减排和两个零售商都投资减排的供应链决策问题。研究发现,两个零售商的利润均与其自身所占市场需求规模成正比,单一零售商投资减排总能使两个零售商的利润都增加,非投资方的利润与溢出系数成正比,投资方与非投资方的利润相较于不投资时的改善度均与其所占市场需求规模成反比。通过算例对比两个零售商分别单独投资与不投资时的利润改善度,发现可能出现溢出过大的情况,从而削弱零售商投资的积极性、产生逆向选择行为。
Considering spillover effect of the retailer’s investment in the manufacturer on emission reduction,a two-level supply chain consisting of a manufacture and two retailers was setup.The supply chain decision-making on single retailer and two retailers investment on emission reduction were studied.The results show that the two retailers’ profits are directly proportional to the market share.It will always increase the profit of the two retailers if one of the retailer invests in carbon emission reduction.The profit of the retailer who doesn’t invest will be directly proportional to the spillover coefficient.Nevertheless,the improvement of the two retailers’ profits are inversely proportional to the market share.The profits’ improvement of the two retailers when they invest separately or do not invest,are compared by the numerical examples.If the overflow is too large,the investment enthusiasm of retailers will be abated and the adverse selection behaviors will come out.
作者
刘名武
王霖
LIU Ming-wu;WANG Lin(School of Economy and management,Chongqing Jiaotong University,Chongqing 400074,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第1期54-63,共10页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
重庆市社科规划"研究阐释党的十九大精神"资助项目(2018sjd01)
重庆市科委基础与前沿研究项目(cstc2018jcyjAX0137)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71601031
71471024)
关键词
溢出效应
低碳偏好
合作减排
主从博弈
spillover effect
emission reduction sharing
low-carbon preference
Stackelberg game