环保第三方监督下钢铁企业碳减排行为及其演化动态

The Carbon Emission Action and Dynamic Evolution Process of the Steel Enterprise under Supervision of a Third-party Environmental Monitoring

为了更好地实施全方位监管,部分地方政府引入环保第三方监督着力提高碳减排效能。构建演化博弈模型研究环保第三方监督下钢铁企业的碳减排行为及其演化动态,分析地方政府资金支持、碳减排补贴和不定期监管对演化均衡策略的影响。研究结果表明:地方政府需建立环保第三方监督约束机制,防止环保第三方监督出现"搭便车"行为;地方政府加强不定期监管,增加碳减排补贴、资金支持、环保第三方监督机构的失职罚款以及钢铁企业的超额排放罚款,有助于促进环保第三方监督机构加大监督力度,提高钢铁企业碳减排意愿,从而有效推动钢铁企业实现碳减排。

In order to improve the all-around inspection,some local government would introduce a third-party environmental monitoring to reduce carbon emission.An evolutionary game model was constructed to study the carbon emission action and dynamic evolution process of the steel enterprise under the supervision of the third-party environmental monitoring.The impacts of the local government’s financial support,irregularly supervision,and carbon emission reduction subsidy on the behavior evolutionary path and stability strategy of the steel enterprise and the third-party environmental monitoring were analyzed.The results show that local government requires to establish a third party environmental supervision and restraint mechanism to prevent the free-rider behavior of the third-party environmental monitoring;local government strengthens irregular supervision,increases subsidies for carbon emission reductions,financial support,dereliction of fines from a third-party environmental monitoring and excessive emission fines from steel companies,which can help third-party monitoring agencies of environmental protection to promote supervision and the steel enterprises to increase the willingness of carbon reduction and effectively improve carbon emission reduction of steel enterprises.