审计合谋问题的分析模型

An Analysis Model of Conspiracy in Auditing

应用声誉博弈模型对审计中合谋问题进行数量经济分析 ,探讨和分析了审计人员与经营者对企业信息不完全披露的博弈关系 .结果表明 ,在审计活动中代理人同审计人员存在策略性行为 ,代理人有贿赂审计人员使之产生合谋行为的可能 ,合谋行为将导致委托人利益损失及审计活动的无效 ,导致审计政策的随机性 ,严重影响审计结论的真实性 .

In economic responsibility audit, there appears a problem that the information respectively held by the auditors and enterprises agents is asymmetrical. The article sets up the Report Game Model to qualificationally analyze the cahoots problem in audit. After analyzing the relationship of the games which the auditors do not completely disclose, we found that there may be strategical action between auditors and agents in audit practice, in other words, it is possible that the agents bribe the auditors for cahoots, which causes the benefit loss of consigner and the non validity of audit, thus inducing the randomicity of audit policy and affecting the authenticity of audit conclusion.