不对称信息下的风险资本委托代理分析

An Analysis of Principal-Agent of Game under the Asymmetric Information in Venture Capital

投资者与风险资本家的关系是风险投资市场中的重要部分。运用博弈论方法 ,从不对称信息的角度分析了风险投资中投资者与风险资本家之间的委托代理关系 ,论述了在有限合伙制构架下投资者对风险资本家的选择、控制、激励与风险分担的问题 ,指出只有对自己能力有充分信心的风险资本家才接受有限合伙制。在有限合伙制中 ,报酬机制是其中心环节 ,它把投资者与风险资本家的利益紧紧的联系在一起 ;投资净收益提成比率则是报酬机制的关键 ,它不仅反映了对风险资本家的激励 ,还反映了投资者与风险资本家间的风险分担的问题 ;同时 ,市场信誉在风险投资中扮演了重要的角色。

The relationship of investors and venture capitalists is an important part in venture capital. Based on asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the principal agent relationship between investors and venture capitalists with game theory. And this paper mainly discusses the choosing, controlling and incentive problem. It suggests that only the capable and self confident venture capitalists could accept the terms of the limited partnership. It also indicates that recompense mechanism which holds the interest of investors and that of venture capitalists tightly is the center of the limited partnership. Rate of yield is the key of recompense mechanism, it not only reflects the incentive on venture capitalists, also reflects the share of risk between investors and venture capitalists. At last, the market credit play an important role in venture capital.