证券监管的博弈分析

Game analysis on securities supervision

运用博弈论理论,建立了证券监管问题的非合作博弈模型。通过对该模型的纯策略均衡和混合策略均衡的分析,从理论上确立了预防证券违法的思路,并结合实际分析了我国股票市场的监管问题,认为目前我国股票市场中违法操作已成为投资者的占优策略,而监管者则是在有选择的监管。因此,加强证券监管不仅要加大对违法操作投资者的惩罚力度,也要对监管者施行有效的激励—约束机制。

This paper establishes a noncooperative game model of securities supervision and theoretically devises a way to prevent securities violation based on the analysis of pure strategy equilibrium and mixed strategy equilibrium. It also analyses the stock market supervision of our country, concluding that the illegal operation is the investor′s dominant strategy and the supervisor is performing an optional supervision in our country's stock market. Therefore, in order to strengthen the securities supervision we should not only inflict more severe punishment on the lawbreakers, but also enforce more effective incentiveconstraint mechanism on the supervisors.