赢者通吃情形下众包竞赛最优奖励机制研究

Optimal Incentive Mechanism in Crowdsourcing Contests with Winner-take-all Prize

作为开放式创新的一种重要形式,众包竞赛被广泛用于解决各类社会经济问题。在众包竞赛中,组织者发布创新任务,解答者完成任务并获得奖励,双方构成委托代理关系,因此可运用委托代理理论研究众包竞赛的最优奖励机制问题。在赢者通吃情形下,众包竞赛采用固定奖励机制或竞价奖励机制组织者和解答者之间激励相容的结果不同,解答者的参赛经验也会对创新绩效产生影响。研究表明:在固定奖励机制下不能实现组织者和解答者之间的激励相容,在竞价奖励机制下激励相容规划存在最优解;当固定奖金金额处于一定范围内,即使不能满足激励相容条件也能实现组织者最大化期望效用的目标;解答者的参赛经验从正向和负向对解答者提交方案的质量产生影响。

As an important form of open innovation,crowdsourcing contests are widely used in solving all kinds of social and economic problems.In a crowdsourcing contest,the organizer issues an innova-tion task,the solvers complete it,and the final winner is rewarded.Crowdsourcing contest is actually a kind of principal-agent activity.Therefore,we use the principal-agent theory to study the incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing contest.In the case of winner-takes-all,we have different conclusions a-bout incentive compatibility in fixed-prize mechanism and reward auction.The solver's participation experience also has influence on innovation performance.It concluded that fixed-prize is not incentive compatible,but reward auction is.When the amount of the fixed-prize is in an appropriate range, fixed-prize mechanism is optimal for organizer without meeting the condition of incentive compatibili-ty.The participation experience has positive and negative effect on the quality of submission.