摘要
在拍卖电力市场中,竞价是供给函数,数量和支付额是基于节点价格或者按报价付费。本文的规划可以应用于批发现货市场,利用变量的微积分推导出结果,得到拍卖市场中构成纳什均衡的欧拉条件和横截性条件。通过3节点系统和IEEE 14节点系统2个算例可以看出,模型对于计及输电容量约束的批发现货市场中发电商的竞价策略具有很好的应用性,为解决市场参与者的发电或输电能力不足时的电力供给均衡问题提供了一条有效途径。
In the auction market of electricity,bidding is supply function while quantity and payment are based on the node price or bid price. The planning model in this paper can be applied to the wholesale spot market. Use variable calculus to derive the results,and obtain the Euler condition and transversality condition of Nash equilibrium in auction market. As illustrated by the 3-bus system and the IEEE 14-bus system,the proposed model has good application for generator's bidding strategies in auction market considering transmission capacity constraints,and provides an effective way to solve the problem of supply function equilibrium when generation or transmission ability of market participants is insufficient.
出处
《华东电力》
北大核心
2014年第10期2180-2185,共6页
East China Electric Power
关键词
供给函数均衡
容量约束
欧拉条件
横截性条件
supply function equilibrium
capacity constraints
Euler condition
transversality condition
