演化博弈视角下的港口危化品监管机制研究

Port dangerous chemicals supervision mechanism based on evolutionary game

针对港口危险化学品(危化品)物流风险监管中存在的问题,本文构建考虑政府严格监管概率和事故发生率的演化博弈模型。采用复制动态方程刻画严格监管的比例和事故发生概率对港口危化品物流企业经营策略的影响过程及规律,并进行数值仿真。研究表明:港口危化品监管中存在"监管悖论"现象,只加强政府严格监管力度,短期会使企业采取设施安全经营策略以应对严格监管,但从长期看,并不能使企业自觉选择设施安全策略。企业策略选择与其经营收入无关,而与事故发生率有关。面对低风险,无论政府监管严格与否,企业都选择忽略风险;面对高风险时,政府不采取严格监管,企业仍会自觉选择设施安全策略合法经营。

Aiming at the problem in supervision of dangerous chemicals in ports,this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between government regulators and accident rate.A replicator dynamic equation is established to depict the evolutional behavior of government and enterprise during supervision of hazardous chemicals in ports.An evolutionary numerical simulation is carried out.The'paradox of supervision'exists in the supervision of hazardous chemicals in ports.In the short term,enterprises tend to choose the safety strategy for facilities to cope with the strict supervision of the government.In the long run,enterprises cannot consciously choose the safety strategy for facilities.The choice of enterprise strategy is not affected by the enterprise income but is related to the probability of accidents.In the face of low risk,regardless of whether government regulations are strict or not,enterprises choose to ignore risks.In the face of high risk,the government does not take strict supervision,and enterprises will consciously choose safety strategy for facilities.