利益博弈与群体力量——基于演化博弈的群体性事件生成机理及其化解

Interest Game and Group Power: A Study of Formation Mechanism of Mass Incidents and Solution to Social Conflicts

通过构建演化博弈模型,结合博弈双方群体力量的变化情况,将群体性事件的演化过程划分为潜伏期、激化期、爆发期和平息期,并结合昆明PX事件描绘出群体性事件演化的过程图。比较分析得出,通过双方主动谈判或第三方干预的方式促成冲突双方达成协议是应对群体性事件最为有效的方式。此外,各级政府部门还需要加强舆情监测情报分析、及时解决民众的利益诉求、加强信息沟通、引导主流新闻媒体的导向、增加政府工作和群体性事件处理的透明度,以期实现对群体性事件的预防和有效治理。

Mass incidents are the result of game between different interest groups. In the mass incidents,the change of group power especially the people's strength plays an important role in the evolution course of social conflicts. In this thesis,we use evolutionary game model to illustrate the evolution course of social conflicts depending on the change of group power,and divide it into four stages: incubation,acute,outbreak and recession. The most effective way to deal with mass incidents is to try to reach a compromise agreement between the people and the local government,which can be realized by active negotiation between the two groups or an intervention of a third party. In addition,in order to prevent the mass incidents,the government should strengthen the information collection system,promptly solve the people's interest problem,using media to guide,and increase the transparency of the government's work.